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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Wagstaff's case is distinguishable from the cases cited by
respondent, which involved multiple use of a proven controlled
substance.

The Board suggests a departure from the Rules of

Evidence not supported by the law and which would work a serious
injustice to petitioner.
ARGUMENT
The respondent Board of Review

(the

"Board") begins its

argument in Point I by attempting to distinguish this case from
Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Dept. of Empl. Security. 11A P.2d 330
(Ut. App. 1987).

It notes that in Champlin the court found the

employee did not violate his company's policy "by reporting to work
under the influence of marijuana or by using it while on the job."
Id.. at 332.
asserting

The Board then contrasts Champlin with this case by

that

Wagstaff

did

violate

his

employer's

policy.

However, the Board fails to identify any evidence showing that
Wagstaff was ever under the influence of a controlled substance.
As was pointed out repeatedly in Wagstaff's opening brief, the
substance involved in his one-time experiment was never established
to be cocaine or any other controlled substance.

No evidence was

offered that consumption of the substance produced any of the
effects ordinarily associated with consumption of a drug. Wagstaff
reported no "high" nor is there any evidence that he was forced to
leave work or that his performance was affected throughout the
remainder of the day.

In contrast, it is without dispute in

Champlin that the employee smoked marijuana twice a week after
1

finishing his work shift.

According to testimony accepted by the

Board of Review in another case that it cites, Johnson v. Dept. of
Enrol. Security, 782 P.2d 965 (Ut. App. 1989), marijuana remains in
the human system for weeks after its initial intake.

Therefore,

the claimant in Champlin was arguably more influenced by his
consumption of a controlled substance than Wagstaff ever was.
The Board also relies on Department of the Air Force v.
Department

of

Employment

Security,

786

P.2d

1361

(Ut. App.

1990)(Butler) and submits that had the employer established its
policy regarding off-base involvement in illegal drugs, "the Board
of Review would have denied benefits to Butler and this court would
have affirmed that denial." Respondent's Brief, at 8.

Ignored by

the

the court

respondent

is the analysis

in Butler wherein

identified two defects in Air Force's case:

1) a failure to

identify any policies or standards of conduct that had been
violated and, 2) a failure to show an adverse effect on the
employer.

Id., at 1366. Arguably, the employee's actions in the

Butler case were more egregious than those attributed to Wagstaff.
Butler admitted that he had sold cocaine to an undercover agent,
was arrested but never prosecuted.

Despite this activity, the

court found no evidence that Butler's acts brought any public
notoriety or dishonor to Air Force or damage to its efficiency,
employee morale or discipline. Butler was not discharged to avoid
potential harm to Air Force.

Like Wagstaff, Butler was dismissed

simply because, according to Air Force, his "conduct violated Air

2

Force standards of conduct and consequently, he should be removed
from employment."
Wagstaff

acknowledges

Air

Force's

rightful

interest

in

removing drug users from its employment; he simply disagrees with
Air

Force's

and

the

Board's

conclusion

that

his

one-time

experimentation with a purported controlled substance classifies
him as a drug user.

Indeed, Air Force in its brief filed in this

case has gone so far as to say that Wagstaff would never have
qualified

for

its

drug

rehabilitation

program,

because

such

programs only apply to people with "an extended history of abuse
who voluntarily seek assistance..." and "Mr. Wagstaff is not such
a person."

Air Force Brief, at 9.

It defies rationality to say

that a repeat drug offender should be able to claim the remedy of
rehabilitation while an employee with a 12-year, perfect record of
employment

who

in

a moment

of

weakness

experiments

with

a

substance, never proven to be a narcotic, must suffer not only job
termination but loss of unemployment compensation as well.

While

such a standard may make sense to the Air Force and the Board,
adoption of

such reasoning by this court would

establish a

precedent far removed from that fundamental fairness which is
inherent in American jurisprudence. The unemployment compensation
statute is designed to deny benefits to those who intentionally
bring about their own termination, not to severely punish those who
make a mistake, repent of it and establish over a seven-month
period their commitment to not repeating their error.

3

Wagstaffs case also differs significantly from the facts in
Johnson v. Dept. of Empl. Security, 782 P.2d 965 (Ut. App. 1989).
It is well established that Johnson was a repeat drug offender.
Johnson tested positive for marijuana use and was given a threeday suspension by his employer, Thiokol Corporation.

While on a

12-month probation, a subsequent random test again proved positive
for marijuana use.

In contrast, Wagstaff is charged with having

consumed a substance that was never tested or in any way proven to
be

a

controlled

substance.

He

admitted

the

incident

voluntarily underwent a urinalysis which proved negative.

and
There

is a significant difference between an employee who twice tests
positive for use of a controlled substance and one who has never
been scientifically established to be a drug user. Approval of the
stringent standard urged by Air Force and the Board would open the
doors to abuse of employee rights in an area already regulated in
favor of employers and against employees' individual rights.
In its second point, the Board suggests to the court that the
OSI report was not actually hearsay and urges the court to approve
its admission as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(8)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Again, the Board suggests a

dangerous precedent and one not supported by the rule itself.
Leaving aside the question whether OSI could be considered a public
office or agency, the Board's suggestion evidences a fundamental
misunderstanding of the purpose of Rule 803(8).

4

The Utah rule, which is based on Federal Rules of Evidence
803(8), is often described as the "official statements" exception
to the hearsay rule. As one court observed:
Actually, this exception is recognized because
of necessity or the inconvenience which would
result from always requiring the testimony of
the official in person to the facts he has
recorded; and his official duty supports the
requirement
that
there
be
found
some
circumstantial probability of trustworthiness.
Vanadium Corp. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co.,
159 F.2d 105, 109 (2nd Cir. 1947) quoting
Wiamore on Evidence §§630-633 (3rd Ed. 1940)
and Richardson on Evidence, 2nd Ed, §591.
The problem with the Board's suggestion is that the OSI report
is not an "official statement" on the order of the toxicology
report at issue in Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm.. 691
P.2d 1244 (Utah 1984).

There is a significant difference between

the report of the state chemist regarding the amount of alcohol
present

in a

"VO and Coke" and statements by witnesses who

themselves are the subject of a criminal investigation, with
nothing to lose and everything to gain from naming other potential
offenders.

The statements which the Board would have this court

accept as admissable evidence are not facts or official statements
but hearsay, not admissable under any exception to the hearsay
rules.
126

As the court in Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113,

(2nd Cir. 1935) stated in rejecting certain tax records

containing hearsay statements:
The public nature of these cards may vitiate
hearsay in the transcription, but it cannot
vitiate hearsay in what is transcribed. The
fact that a record is public adds nothing to
what is recorded.
5

The public records exception to the hearsay rule is intended
to benefit the public official who recorded certain facts, not to
transform hearsay statements into admissable evidence. Nor was the
rule designed to promote the convenience of the Air Force by
relieving it of the "substantial burden and expense of producing
as witnesses

at unemployment

insurance

hearings

the

various

individuals cited in the OSI report..." Respondent's Brief, at 15.
The Board forgets that the employer has the burden of proving just
cause in a case of this type.
suggestion

regarding

Rule

While adoption of the Board's

803(8)

might

allow

it

to

"more

efficiently deal with its substantial case load...", it would do
so at the expense of claimant's constitutional right to due
process.
Finally, the Board overlooks an important qualifier in Rule
803(8): the exception does not apply if "the sources of information
or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness."

Air

Force's own witness admitted to a major "typographical error" which
caused the statement of another employee to be attributed to
Wagstaff.

See Petitioner's Brief, at 5.

OSI's inability to

correctly record information casts serious doubt on the reliability
of the statements recorded.
CONCLUSION
In its brief, the Board agrees with the employer that an
employee's one-time experimentation with a substance purported to
be a controlled drug is just cause for disqualifying him from
unemployment compensation.

Wagstaff maintains that such a policy
6

is contrary

to respondent's

own regulations which direct an

assessment of the degree of culpability and which allow exceptions
for isolated incidents. The Board goes one step further and urges
the court to accept as admissable evidence hearsay statements
contained in the report of an investigation unit of the employer,
thereby shifting the burden of proof from the employer to the
employee and making its own job easier. Wagstaff urges the court
to reject this extreme suggestion and reverse the Board's decision
as argued in its opening brief.
DATED this^* 7

day of January, 1991.
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorney for Petitioner
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